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study.1. INTRODUCTION
Natural resources constitute an important axis around
which rural territorial dynamics revolve (Berdegue´,
Bebbington, & Escobal, 2015; Berdegue´ et al., 2011). Not only
do they provide a source of livelihood, income, and a sense of
meaning and identity to rural populations; they also constitute
a source of revenue and authority to national and district gov-
ernments, a source of wealth to national economic and polit-
ical elites, and the basis for the provision of ecosystem
services of local, regional, and global importance (MEA,
2005). This makes the governance of natural resources a pow-
erful lens (Larson & Ribot, 2004) for examining territorial
dynamics, i.e., processes of social, economic, political, and
institutional change in a given territory and their concomitant
changes in development outcomes such as growth, distribution
of assets and beneﬁts, social inclusiveness and environmental
sustainability.
Governance of natural resources such as water, land and
forests, may be understood as the establishment, reaﬃrmation,
or change of institutions (policies, procedures, practices and
organizations) which regulate or resolve conﬂicts – overt or
latent – between actors, both users as well as authorities, with
respect to access to and the conditions for use of natural
resources (e.g., Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Paavola, 2007). Gov-
ernance of natural resources takes place at many inter-con-
nected levels ranging from the international level through
multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention
on Biological Diversity, through the national level with its leg-
islation and national agencies, to the territorial and local levels
e.g., through district-level by-laws, administrative procedures
and community-based arrangements e.g., for the use of ﬁre
and ﬁre control. In this paper, we focus at the governance of
natural resources as it takes place at the sub-national level.
In the aftermath of the Sandinista revolution in 1979 and
the civil war during the 1980s, Nicaragua embarked upon a
process of political decentralization which gradually –
although at times somewhat reluctantly – also got translated
into the assignation of speciﬁc legal and administrative powers72to the districts. The emergence of elected district governments
coincided with a growing environmental concern, both inter-
nationally and locally. Combined with the central importance
of natural resources to rural territorial dynamics, natural
resource governance in many places came to constitute an
important issue in district politics and administration.
Although district governments and their administrations
may be regarded as new institutions established in Nicaraguan
districts in 1990 on a common legal basis, they were not cre-
ated in a void but in diﬀerent territories, each being character-
ized by speciﬁc social, economic, and political structures and
thus by diﬀerent levels and patterns of inequality.
Inspired by recent literature on inequality and natural
resource governance from the perspective of new institutional
economics (e.g., Boyce, 1994; Clement & Meunie, 2010; Li &
Reuveny, 2006; Paavola, 2007), this paper is concerned with
how diﬀerent social, economic, and political structures shape
district-level natural resource governance and in particular,
how diﬀerent levels and patterns of inequality inﬂuence the
persistence and change of speciﬁc institutional practices. Based
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Dani, de Haan, and Walton (2008), the World Development
Report 2006 argued that high levels of economic and political
inequality tend to produce economic institutions and social
arrangements that – legally or extra-legally – systematically
favor the interests of those with more inﬂuence (World
Bank, 2005). The report launched the concept of ‘inequality
traps’ referring to situations where personal and property
rights are enforced only selectively, where budgetary alloca-
tions beneﬁt mainly the politically inﬂuential, and where the
distribution of public services favors the wealthy, and thus,
where both middle and poorer groups end up with unexploited
talent. “These adverse eﬀects of unequal opportunities and
political power on development,” the report argues, “are all
the more damaging because economic, political, and social
inequalities tend to reproduce themselves over time and across
generations.” (World Bank, 2005, p. 2). “These patterns of
domination persist because economic and social diﬀerences
are reinforced by the overt and covert use of power. Elites pro-
tect their interests in subtle ways, by exclusionary practices in
marriage and kinship systems, for instance, and in ways that
are less subtle, such as aggressive political manipulation or
the explicit use of violence.” (World Bank, 2005, p. 2).
Robinson (2010) talks of this mutually constituting and
reinforcing relationship between political and economic insti-
tutions as ‘institutional persistence’. Institutional persistence
is produced and reproduced ‘when those with power in any
given moment choose political institutions in the future and
they naturally tend to choose those which reproduce their de
jure power. This persistence is further strengthened when those
with power in any given moment determine economic institu-
tions which tend to distribute resources in their favor, thus
reproducing their de facto power’ (Robinson, 2010, p. 9).
More recently, this focus on path-dependent, institutional
inequality traps (Rao, 2006), has been complemented by a
focus on gradual institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen,
2011). In their theory of gradual institutional change,
Mahoney and Thelen (2011) examine the relationship between
diﬀerent modes of institutional change and the political and
institutional context. In particular, they argue, two features
characterizing the political and institutional context are asso-
ciated with diﬀerent modes of institutional change. The ﬁrst
of these two features is the extent to which the political context
is associated with strong or weak veto possibilities. Veto
possibilities, they explain, “can derive either from especially
powerful veto players or from numerous institutional veto
points” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2011, p. 18). “Veto possibilities
are high where there exist actors who have access to institu-
tional or extra-institutional means of blocking change”
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2011, p. 19). The second feature is the
extent to which a particular institution is characterized by a
high or low level of discretion, i.e. the extent to which deci-
sions are made according to the judgment of individual actors
or according to pre-established rules which guide the interpre-
tation and enforcement of legal and administrative rules.
Combined these characteristics of the political and institu-
tional context for a particular institution such as district-level
environmental units produce diﬀerent opportunities for poten-
tial change-agents such as district environmental oﬃcers and
their constituencies for promoting gradual institutional
change, in this case the institutional practices through which
natural resources are governed. In turn, such emerging institu-
tional practices may contribute to reshape and gradually
change the political context.
This resonates with the ﬁndings reported by Andersson
(2002, 2004) and Andersson and Ostrom (2008). In hisresearch on district-level forest governance in 32 districts in
Bolivia, Andersson found considerable diﬀerences in their for-
est governance performance despite operating within a single
legal framework. Andersson (2004) and Andersson and
Ostrom (2008) propose that this varied performance to a large
extent is explained by the face-to-face interactions – both hor-
izontal and vertical – which district oﬃcers maintain. Vertical
interactions are interactions between actors at diﬀerent levels
of government, such as between (groups of) users of forest
resources and a district forest oﬃcer or between a district for-
est oﬃcer and a ministry delegate (Andersson, 2004). Vertical
interactions are important to ensure upward as well as down-
ward accountability from district authorities (see also Ribot,
2002, 2004). Horizontal interactions are interactions between
actors at the same level, e.g., between forest oﬃcers working
in diﬀerent organizations for example in other districts or gov-
ernment agencies, NGOs, etc. Horizontal interactions are
important for sharing insights and experiences on how to solve
common problems, planning joined activities, etc. (Andersson,
2004). Based on theories on polycentric governance, i.e., the
relationships among multiple authorities with overlapping
mandates, Andersson and Ostrom propose that a governance
system that manages to distribute capabilities and duties in
such a way that perverse incentive and information problems
at one level are oﬀset to some extent by positive incentives
and information capabilities for actors at other levels, will
achieve better outcomes than either a highly centralized or
fully decentralized system (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008, p.
73). In this way, they argue, multi-level or polycentric gover-
nance contributes to produce checks and balances and hence
to limit the space for discretional implementation and enforce-
ment of the rules relating to the governance of natural
resources.
On this basis, the paper sets out to examine the institu-
tional practices through which district-level governance of
natural resource use is performed in two Nicaraguan territo-
ries with diﬀerent patterns of inequality, namely the Estelı´
area in northern part of Nicaragua, consisting of the districts
of Estelı´ and Condega, and the Santo Toma´s area, consisting
of the districts of Santo Toma´s, San Pedro de Lo´vago and
Villa Sandino in the Chontales department at the eastern
shores of the Cocibolca Lake (Figure 1). In particular the
paper focuses upon the character and frequency of horizontal
and vertical interactions as a distinguishing feature of the
institutional practices through which district-level governance
of natural resource use takes place, which reﬂect but also
hold the potential to gradually shape the political and institu-
tional context through widening or narrowing the veto possi-
bilities and the room for discretion in the governance of
natural resource use that characterize the political and institu-
tional context.
The paper is divided into six sections. The following
section describes the methods employed and the data sets
produced as part of the empirical work underlying the paper.
Section three brieﬂy introduces to two territories where
empirical research has been undertaken, emphasizing their
diﬀerences with respect to distribution of land and the
continued presence of small-scale farmers, while the fourth
section describes the role that district authorities play in
the governance of natural resource use in Nicaragua.
Section ﬁve presents the results of the empirical research
conducted as the basis for this paper and, through this lens,
examines the institutional practices through which the dis-
trict-level governance of natural resource use takes place in
the two areas. Finally the sixth and last section concludes
and provides some ﬁnal reﬂections.
Figure 1. Nicaragua: Location of Santo Toma´s and Estelı´ areas and districts.
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Empirically, this paper examines the institutional practices
through which district-level governance of natural resource
use takes place through the lens of how (i) applications for
natural resource permissions and (ii) denouncements, i.e., sub-
mission of formal accusations, of alleged natural resource use
infractions presented to district authorities by citizens, are
dealt with. The paper draws on two data sets. The ﬁrst data
set is based upon real-time registration of (i) applications for
permission to use speciﬁc natural resources and of (ii)
denouncements of allegedly illegal use of natural resources,
both presented to district authorities by citizens during the
period between April and August 2011 1 in four of the ﬁve dis-
tricts 2 in the Estelı´ and Santo Toma´s areas. The real-time reg-
istration was carried out by district environmental oﬃcers in
the four districts, using pre-established formats for applica-
tions and denouncements, respectively, which had been devel-
oped in collaboration with a former district environmental
oﬃcer. 3 The formats solicited details about (i) the applicant
and the type of use and the resource for which permission
was applied, and (ii) the complainant and the issue denounced,
respectively. In addition the formats solicited information
about the actions taken vis-a`-vis the application or denounce-
ment and the institutions involved. A total of 134 applications
and 57 denouncements were registered in the four districts. In
Nicaragua, the period between April and August corresponds
to the end of the dry season and the ﬁrst half of the rainy sea-
son. Given the seasonality which characterizes the use – and
alleged misuse – of natural resources, the data set, therefore,
should not be interpreted to provide the complete picture of
the types of natural resource use permissions solicited and
issues denounced, nor of the yearly number of applications
and denouncements presented to the district authorities.The second data set focusses on the use of ﬁre for land
clearing and is a recording of (i) permissions issued for land
clearing through the use of ﬁre and (ii) denouncements of
the poorly controlled use of ﬁre to clear pastures before the
rains, putting lives and properties at risk, presented to district
authorities in the Santo Toma´s area during 2003–09. The data
set was recorded in 2010 through interviews with district oﬃ-
cers and through the revision of district administrative
records. The recording was made only for the Santo Toma´s
area. A total of 1,839 farmers received district authorization
to use ﬁre for land clearing, many of them through commu-
nity-level applications, while a total of 75 denouncements of
unauthorized or poorly controlled ﬁres were identiﬁed through
this reconstruction.
Each of these two data sets provides insights into the insti-
tutional practices through which district-level governance of
natural resource takes place and may thus be expected to pro-
vide reﬂections of the political and institutional contexts where
they take place, including the veto possibilities and the level of
discretion in district-level natural resource governance. These
insights are further contextualized on the basis of extensive
research carried out in the districts over the past decade by
the authors (Go´mez, 2013; Go´mez & Ravnborg, 2011, 2012;
IICA, 2004; Ravnborg, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008).3. THE STUDY AREAS – TWO RURAL TERRITORIES
WITH DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF INEQUALITY
Despite the Sandinista revolution in 1979, current distribu-
tion of productive assets such as land and water in Nicaragua
testiﬁes to a long history of land and water grabbing by the
political elites – initially through coercive processes of coloni-
zation, later through economic and political means – and the
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into private property (Broegaard, 2009, 2013; de Janvry &
Sadoulet, 2000; Deininger, Zegarra, & Lavadenz, 2003;
Go´mez & Ravnborg, 2012; Ravnborg, 2006, 2008; Ruben &
Masset, 2003; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003).
After independence from the Spanish Crown in 1821, liberal
ideas from Europe inﬂuenced local political discourse. How-
ever, political practice was adapted to ﬁt the interests of the
political elite in Nicaragua. With the booms in export crops
around the middle of the nineteenth century, ﬁrst for coﬀee
and later cotton and sugarcane, land ownership became
increasingly more important and contested. In 1862, the Nic-
araguan government “decreed that land suitable for coﬀee
might be expropriated ‘in the national interest’” (Dore, 2006,
p. 71). The state promoted large-scale production through
subsidies and taxation systems that favored large plantations
(Dore, 2006, p. 71). Dore (2006) and Gould (1998) document
this land grabbing by the political elite and how the political
elite thereby succeeded in establishing itself also as the coun-
try’s economic elite. Dore concludes: “The triumph of private
property in Nicaragua was achieved not through the workings
of the market’s invisible hand, but through relentless state
intervention to divest Indians of the common property rights
they had enjoyed since the conquest.” (Dore, 2006, p. 72).
In the Santo Toma´s area, the towns of Santo Toma´s and
San Pedro de Lo´vago were founded during this period, namely
in 1861 and 1864, respectively, when the government decided
to relocate the Loviguisca indigenous community to these
town areas. It is estimated that at the time of the relocation
the Loviguisca community comprised 250 people (Espinoza,
2009; INIFOM, n.d.a). Villa Sandino developed much later
around the Pueblo Viejo settlement that grew from a camp
inhabited by the workers who were constructing the road con-
necting Chontales to El Rama and Muelle de los Bueyes. In
1892, the settlement only had three houses (Espinoza, 2009;
INIFOM, n.d.a).
During this period from the mid to late 19th century the ﬁrst
settler families arrived to the Santo Toma´s area. They estab-
lished their haciendas on the ejidos (common land) and by
claiming land that ‘belonged to no one’ at the mayor’s oﬃce
and by paying one peso for between 100 and 150 manzanas 4
(corresponding to 70–105 hectares) per year, they obtained
usage rights. Those who were able, continued to pay the rent
year after year, until eventually they could claim possession of
the land and obtain private property rights.
Favored by the gently undulating landscape and the vast land
extensions, extensive livestock farming soon became the major
economic activity in the area. Families arriving later, e.g., up
until the 1950s and 1960s tended to settle on land now belong-
ing to the large estates, where the owners allowed them to plant
crops, such as maize and beans, as tenant farmers. It is esti-
mated 5 that in 1963, the average farm size in the Santo Toma´s
area was 64 hectares and that approximately half of all rural
households had no land but worked as agricultural laborers
supplemented by growing food crops as tenant farmers. Often
land owners allowed tenant farmers to grow food crops for a
number of years in return for the tenant farmers opening up
the land by cutting down and burning the forest. As a caretaker
of a farm in Tierra Blanca, a community not far from Santo
Toma´s town told us: “That is how we made a living in the past:
Cutting down the forest, setting ﬁre and there came the harvest
of all sorts of crops: maize, rice, beans, bananas.” (Personal
communication, January 30, 2009; own translation).
The colonization of the Estelı´ area dates further back than
that of the Santo Toma´s area. Estelı´ was founded already in
1685 and was created as a department in 1829 (INIFOM,n.d.b). Condega which used to be an important indigenous
community was founded ﬁrst as a small town, a villa, in
1856 and later, in 1962 as a town (ciudad) (INIFOM, n.d.b).
Like in the Santo Toma´s area, large estates were formed
during the late 19th century and were further consolidated
up through the 20th century. However, in diﬀerence with the
Santo Toma´s area, these estates were established upon a
matrix of scattered but already existing small- and medium-
sized farms. Thus, the estates were established partly through
a process of claiming ‘virgin’ land, partly through a process of
taking over smaller farms in cases where owners of these farms
became indebted to the new estate owners (Octupan, 2004).
Initially, the large estates engaged in coﬀee production in the
mountainous areas while cotton and also tobacco production
expanded in the valley along the Estelı´ River. Livestock farm-
ing, which had been important all along, signiﬁcantly
expanded during the 1960s and into the 1970s, particularly
in the foothills taking advantage of the growing demand for
meat, primarily driven by the growing fast food market in
the United States. In 1962, a slaughter house was established
in Condega by a North American and two Nicaraguan
investors (Octupan, 2004).
Despite the existence of large estates, in a few cases reaching
up to 10,000 hectares (Octupan, 2004, p. 82), these have
always co-existed with small- and medium-sized farms.
According to the agricultural census made in 1963, the average
farm size in the Estelı´ area was ‘only’ 34 hectares.
While the agricultural frontier had stabilized in the Estelı´
area, new land continued to be taken into possession in the
Santo Toma´s area. In the period during 1963–2001, the agri-
cultural area grew by 28% in the Santo Toma´s area, while in
Estelı´ department the agricultural area contracted slightly
(3%) in the same period. Moreover, despite the agrarian
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, the average property size
increased in the Santo Toma´s area from 64 hectares in 1963
to 67 hectares in 2001, while in the Estelı´ area, the average
property size decreased from 34 to 23 hectares in the same
period (INEC, 2002).
In part due to these diﬀerent colonization trajectories, in
part due to the fact that coﬀee cultivation remains an eco-
nomic opportunity even to small-scale farmers as long as they
can mobilize the necessary labor force, a considerable number
of small-scale farms have continued to exist in the Estelı´ area
while in the Santo Toma´s area these have virtually disap-
peared due to economies of scale that are much more impor-
tant in extensive livestock keeping (Ravnborg & Gomez,
2015). More than two-thirds of the agricultural properties in
the Estelı´ area are smaller than 14 hectares, while this is the
case for only 18% of the properties in the Santo Toma´s area,
which is dominated by medium- and large-scale properties
(INEC, 2001). A quarter of the agricultural properties in the
Santo Toma´s area are larger than 70 hectares and only a
minority of the owners of these properties (22%) live on the
property (INEC, 2001), either because they own several prop-
erties (Ravnborg & Gomez, 2015) or because they live in town.
In the Estelı´ area, only 7% of the agricultural properties are
larger than 70 hectares and 42% of the owners of these prop-
erties live on the property (Ravnborg & Gomez, 2015). Over-
all, more than half (56%) of the agricultural properties in the
Santo Toma´s area have absentee landowners while this is
the case for 36% of the agricultural properties in the Estelı´ area
(Ravnborg & Gomez, 2015). Although small-scale farmers in
the Estelı´ area 6 only control around 15% of the agricultural
area (Ravnborg & Gomez, 2015), their presence and relative
share of the rural population imply that rural communities
in the Estelı´ area are dominated by small- and medium-scale
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rural communities are characterized to a much larger extent
by a mix of care-takers, casual laborers and tenant farmers,
a few small-scale farmers and owners of medium- and large-
scale farms of whom the majority reside elsewhere. As argued
by e.g., Bebbington (1999) and Lund (2011a, 2011b), the
importance of land rights and property extends beyond merely
constituting a source livelihood, to also engender a sense and a
claim of belonging to a place and to a political community.
Owning property, however small, thus nurtures the sense of
citizenship with the rights and obligations it entails rather than
that of being a dependent subject (whether dependent of a
patron for work or in-kind help or of a local or national gov-
ernment e.g., for cash transfers). According to many observ-
ers, the Estelı´ area has a long history of community
organization. As a former mayor of Estelı´ explains:
Estelı´ has a history of organization which has its roots from the period
prior to revolutionary victory. We organized ourselves into what was
called ‘neighborhood groups.’ All neighborhoods were organized; we
organized ourselves for the war, that was how we fought and that
was how we did things.
[Former mayor of Estelı´, personal communication, September 23,
2011, own translation]
More recently, small-scale farmers ﬁrst in Estelı´ and later in
Condega district have successfully advocated for the establish-
ment of protected landscapes in an eﬀort to also protect their
economic livelihoods as small-scale farmers (Ravnborg, 2008;
Ravnborg et al., 2010). Conversely, in the Santo Toma´s area,
the structure of land ownership has tended to favor the forma-
tion of dependent clients and eﬀorts to promote and citizen
participation in district planning have largely failed (Go´mez
& Ravnborg, 2012; Ravnborg & Gomez, 2015).
Reﬂecting the lack of economic opportunities to the less
resourceful households, the population of the Santo Toma´s
area has stagnated and even declined, particularly in the rural
areas, 7 whereas in the Estelı´ the population has grown by 19%
overall and by 4% in the rural areas during the same period 8
(INEC, 1995, INIDE, 2005).4. DECENTRALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE
The ﬁrst district government elections were held in all Nica-
raguan districts outside the two autonomous regions in 1990
on the basis of the District Law 9 which had been approved
in 1988. Before 1990, the district administration had existed
only as a local representation of the central government rather
than as a democratically elected political space. The creation
of this new political and administrative space coincided with
an international wave of environmental attention based on
the publication of the report of the Brundtland commission
entitled Our Common Future and the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in Rı´o in 1992. This new interna-
tional attention seriously questioned the ‘colonization logic’
which hitherto had characterized policies in many Latin Amer-
ican countries with respect to the governance of natural
resources in general and land use in particular. Partly due to
this temporal coincidence, partly due to the fact that in Nica-
ragua as well as in many other poor developing countries, the
international development agencies played a central role in
promoting political and administrative decentralization
(Larson, 2004) as well as the environmental agenda, the dis-
trict governments were born with considerable responsibilities
with respect to the governance of natural resources.In the case of Nicaragua, the District Law assigns authority
to the district governments over all aspects that relate to
socio-economic development and to the protection of the
environment and the natural resources within their area of
jurisdiction. 10 Furthermore it mandates the district
governments to develop, protect, and ensure the rational use
of the environment and the natural resources as a basis for
the development of the district and the country, to promote
local initiatives to this end and, in coordination with the
appropriate national agencies, to contribute to the
monitoring, surveillance and control of the environment and
the natural resource use. 11 In addition to these general
responsibilities, also the Environment Law 12 from 1996 and
other sectoral and resource speciﬁc laws such as the Forest
Laws 13 and the Water Law 14 assign natural resource-related
responsibilities and competences to the district governments.
The district governments are supposed to form district envi-
ronmental commissions with the mandate to promote the
environmentally sound use and protection of the districts nat-
ural resources and to prepare district-wide environmental ini-
tiatives such as district by-laws. In many districts, the district
environmental commission serves as the institutional platform
for coordination with the relevant ministries and agencies,
with civil society and non-governmental organizations as well
as with the communities through the participation of commu-
nity representatives. As such, it holds the potential to facilitate
both horizontal (e.g., between technical staﬀ from diﬀerent
key ministries or between community representatives from
diﬀerent communities) and vertical interactions (e.g., between
technical staﬀ from key ministries, district level staﬀ and
community representatives). In addition, the district adminis-
trations are supposed to staﬀ a district environmental unit
responsible for carrying out the environmental tasks assigned
to it by the district council and the district environmental
commission. 15
Despite the common legal and administrative framework for
the governance of natural resources, the institutional practices
through which the governance of natural resources is per-
formed at the district level vary greatly among the ﬁve districts
in the two areas. While the key ministries and government
agencies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and
Forestry (MAGFOR), Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources (MARENA) and the National Forestry Institute
(INAFOR) participate in the district environmental commis-
sion meetings in Estelı´ and Condega districts, 16 this is not
the case in the Santo Toma´s area. Moreover, and perhaps as
a consequence, the district environmental commission in San
Pedro de Lo´vago, one of the three districts constituting the
Santo Toma´s area, has not convened since 2009 while in
another of the three districts, Villa Sandino, it only convenes
every three months and generally without the participation
of key ministries and agencies such as MAGFOR, MARENA,
and INAFOR (Go´mez & Buitrago, 2012).
In most Nicaraguan districts, the district environmental unit
– if existing – consists of a single oﬃcer with only limited equip-
ment and information at his or her disposal. This is also the
case in the district administrations of the Santo Toma´s and
Estelı´ areas with the exception of Estelı´ district which has
recently expanded its environmental unit to count three techni-
cal staﬀ members. Thus, district environmental oﬃcers depend
to a large extent on information from citizens as well as from
staﬀ members from other organizations working in the districts
to detect environmental issues that require attention and at
times institutional change. In this respect, denouncements of
environmentally or otherwise harmful use of natural resources
provide an important source of information and impetus
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ing two cases illustrate.
In November 2005 the Condega District Council approved
its ﬁrst district by-law prohibiting the irrigation of tobacco
and other crops during the dry months of March and April.
The by-law had been under discussion in the district
environmental commission for a number of years prior to its
approval, but had been met with threats from the cigar facto-
ries of withdrawing from the district if the by-law was
approved, which would leave a considerable number of people
unemployed. However, repeated denouncements from citizens
of the use of water for irrigation of tobacco during the dry
season, particularly in the wake of the exceptionally dry sea-
son of 2004–05, led to the approval of the by-law (Go´mez &
Ravnborg, 2011). A revised and further tightened version of
this by-law was approved late 2009. In addition to the prepa-
ration of these district by-laws regulating the use of water for
dry season irrigation, the repeated denouncements and the
debates they provoked in the district environmental commis-
sion, led to the institutionalization of the monitoring of
tobacco growing in the district. Thus as part of his or her reg-
ular tasks, the district environmental oﬃcer should register
tobacco ﬁelds in the district, their acreage, the capacity of
the pumps used for irrigation, and the date of transplanting
the tobacco. Based on this registry, the district environmental
oﬃcer would be accompanied by a district police oﬃcer when
during the dry season undertaking inspections along the trib-
utaries to detect unauthorized withdrawals of water from the
river for irrigation. On such an occasion, early March 2009,
the district environmental oﬃcer encountered and conﬁscated
23 pumps taking water out of the Pire River.
In the Santo Toma´s area repeated denouncements from
rural and urban citizens alike of the ﬁres set by farmers to
clean their pastures before the onset of the rains, but escaping
out of control and thus putting lives and properties at risk,
similarly gave rise to a set of measures to regulate and restrict
the use of ﬁre for agricultural purposes. First in 2004, the
district environmental commission prepared a district by-law
to regulate solid waste disposals, but which in addition
addressed the use of ﬁre for land preparation and introduced
a NIO 5,000 (approximately USD 300) ﬁne for using ﬁre for
land clearing without having obtained prior permission from
the district authorities. In this case, the district authorities
would act on behalf of MAGFOR which holds the overall
responsibility for regulating the use of ﬁre for land clearing
in Nicaragua. However, in cases of serious infractions which
require the opening of a legal process, the district administra-
tion should pass the case to MAGFOR or to the environmen-
tal attorney. Subsequently in 2005, the Santo Toma´s District
Council approved a district by-law aimed at protecting water
sources and detaining deforestation within the district. This
by-law permits the use of controlled ﬁre for land preparationTable 1. Applications for natural resource use permission according to u
Estelı´ area
Estelı´
(n = 21)
Condega
(n = 58)
– Use of forest resources 71 95
– Extraction of gravel, stones, etc. 10 3
– Disposal of solid waste in soil 19 –
– Other – 2
All issues/resources 100 100
Source: Registration of applications ﬁled with the District Environmental Unprior to sowing, but prohibits the use of ﬁre for clearing of
pastures. With the approval in November 2005 of the Law
against Environmental Crimes, 17 the district administrations
were oﬀered a second option for opening a legal process in
case of environmental oﬀenses, namely to denounce the case
directly to the prosecutor which would then ask the police to
undertake the necessary investigation of the case.5. GOVERNANCE OF THE USE OF NATURAL
RESOURCES IN THE SANTO TOMA´S AND ESTELI´
AREAS
During the period from April to August 2011, the district
authorities in San Pedro de Lo´vago and Villa Sandino districts
in the Santo Toma´s area and in Estelı´ and Condega districts in
the Estelı´ area received a total of 134 applications for natural
resource use permission and 57 denouncements of alleged
natural resource use infractions divided among districts and
resource use applied for/issues denounced as shown in Tables
1 and 2. As the registration was undertaken toward the end of
the dry season and during the ﬁrst half of the rainy season, the
majority of the applications (91%) for natural resource use
permission relate to the use of forest resources while the
denouncements deal with issues relating to the use of ﬁre for
land clearing, forest resources and use of water for irrigation.
Table 3 provides a proﬁle of the applicants for authorization
of natural resource use from the district authorities. While in
the Santo Toma´s area the majority of the applicants are
owners of farms larger than 35 hectares (67% in San Pedro
de Lo´vago district and 54% in Villa Sandino district), who
in San Pedro de Lo´vago furthermore tend not to live on the
farm and thus in the area where the resource utilization will
take place, the majority of the applicants in the Estelı´ area live
in the community where the resource utilization will take place
and are owners of farms smaller than seven hectares (80% in
Estelı´ district and 89% in Condega district).
Probably reﬂecting the history of community organization,
more than half of the denouncements presented to district
authorities in the Estelı´ area between April and August 2011
were submitted by community organizations (Table 4). In addi-
tion to these denouncements, the district environmental com-
mission in Condega district decided to ask the police to
notify a total of 45 farmers who had been observed by members
of the district environmental commission clearing their land
through the use of ﬁre without having received permission.
In the Santo Toma´s area, the majority of the denounce-
ments were presented by individuals (60% in San Pedro de
Lo´vago and all of the denouncements presented in Villa
Sandino). Moreover, one-third of the denouncements made
in San Pedro de Lo´vago were ﬁled by an oﬃcial either
from the district administration, from the police or from ase and/or resource. Percent applications by resource use per district
Santo Toma´s area All districts (N = 134)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 42)
Villa Sandino
(n = 13)
93 100 91
7 – 5
– – 3
– – 1
100 100 100
its.
Table 2. Denouncements according to issue and/or resource. Percent denouncement by issue or resource use per district
Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts (N = 57)
Estelı´
(n = 20)
Condega
(n = 10)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 20)
Villa Sandino
(n = 7)
– Timber, logging, ﬁre wood 5 30 45 43 28
– Fires 70 30 10 57 40
– Water (contamination, use for irrigation, etc.) 25 30 35 – 26
– Extraction of gravel, stones, etc. – 10 5 – 4
– Wild fauna – – 5 – –
All issues/resources 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Registration of denouncements ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
Table 3. Proﬁle of natural resource use applicants. Percent applicants by farm size and place of living, by district
Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts (N = 134)
Estelı´
(n = 21)
Condega
(n = 58)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 42)
Villa Sandino
(n = 13)
Estimated farm size of applicant***
<0.7 ha 80 53 19 31 44
0.7–7 ha – 36 2 – 17
8–35 ha 10 7 12 15 10
36–70 ha 10 2 29 23 14
>70 ha – 2 38 31 16
Residence of applicant***
– In community where resource use will take place 52 88 24 69 60
– In district capital 48 10 55 23 31
– Outside the district – 2 21 8 8
Source: Registration of applications ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
*** p < .001; Pearson’s chi-square test.
Table 4. Proﬁle of complainants of misuse of natural resources. Percent denouncements by type of complainant, by district
Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts (N = 57)
Estelı´
(n = 20)
Condega
(n = 10)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 20)
Villa Sandino
(n = 7)
Community member 25 50 60 100 51
Community organization 75 50 10 – 39
Individual from outside the community – – 30 – 11
All 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Registration of denouncement ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
78 WORLD DEVELOPMENTgovernment agency rather than by the aﬀected citizen(s). One
of the explanations given for this procedure relates to the fact
that people hesitate to denounce others due to fear of possible
retaliation:
Practically we do not like to get involved with this kind of dangerous
people; therefore it is the district oﬃce that is taking action on the mat-
ter . . . because it makes me afraid. They always move around, armed
with their machete; I don’t carry anything, neither a gun, nor a ma-
chete. And anytime they are people capable of threatening me with
their machete, even lynch me up. I prefer to avoid that and leave the
responsibility to the police and the district oﬃce.
[Aﬀected farmer, San Pedro de Lo´vago, personal communication,
October 4, 2011]
Tables 5 and 6 show the actions taken following the presen-
tation of the application or the denouncement to the district
authorities. In the vast majority of cases, in situ inspections
were made, with the exception of the applications presented
to district authorities in San Pedro de Lo´vago whereinspections were made only with respect to a quarter of the
applications (Table 5).
However, whereas the district environmental oﬃcers in the
Santo Toma´s area usually have to carry out these inspections
alone, the district environmental oﬃcers in the Estelı´ area, and
particularly in Condega district, tend to be accompanied by an
oﬃcer or representative from at least one other institution. In
Condega district, an average of 1.9 institutions (Table 5) and
2.8 institutions (Table 6) participate in in situ inspections in
the case of applications and denouncements, respectively.
Finally, Tables 7 and 8 provide information on the decisions
made with respect to the applications and denouncements pre-
sented to district authorities in the four districts. With respect
to the applications for natural resource use permission the
majority were approved whether on the basis of the in-situ
inspections undertaken (69% of the applications), on the basis
of community endorsement of the application (2%), or on the
basis of the assessment of the district environmental oﬃcer
Table 5. Institutional participation in in-situ inspections related to applications for natural resource use, by district (N = 134). Percent applications per
district
Inspections made and agency participating Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts
(N = 134)Estelı´
(n = 21)
Condega
(n = 58)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 42)
Villa Sandino
(n = 13)
In-situ inspection undertaken***,a 81 91 26 100 70
Average number of institutionsb participating in the in-situ inspection*,c 1.3 1.9 0.3d 1.2 1.7
Percent applications with participation in inspection of:
– District environmental oﬃcer***,a 81 91 26 100 70
–District police – 3 – – 2
–MARENA**,a 24 14 – – 10
– MAGFOR – 5 – – 2
– INAFOR**,a 24 72 – 15 37
Application has received pre-approval of community leader/organization***,a 81 81 – 15 49
Source: Registration of applications ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
a Pearson’s chi-square test.
b The participation of institutions include the following eight institutions: (i) the district environmental oﬃcer; (ii) the mayor or vice mayor; (iii) the police;
(iv) the military; (v) MARENA; (vi) MAGFOR; (vii) INAFOR; and (viii) the district environmental commission.
c The average number of institutions participating in the in-situ inspections is signiﬁcantly higher in Condega than in the remaining three districts, and
signiﬁcantly higher in the Estelı´ area than in the Santo Toma´s area; (p < .05; one-way analysis of variance, Scheﬀe test.
d If only applications where in-situ inspections are included (n = 11), an average of 1.0 institutions participated in in-situ inspections in San Pedro de
Lo´vago.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Table 6. Institutional participation in in-situ inspections related to denouncements, by district (N = 57)
Inspections made and agency participating Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts
(N = 57)Estelı´
(n = 20)
Condega
(n = 10)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 20)
Villa Sandino
(n = 7)
In-situ inspection undertaken*,a 100 100 75 100 91
Average number of institutionsb participating in the in-situ inspection*,c 1.8 2.8 1.3d 1.4 1.7
Percent denouncements with participation in inspection of:
– District environmental oﬃcer*a 75 90 100 100 89
– District police**,a – 50 40 29 25
– MARENA*,a 50 20 20 – 29
– MAGFOR*,a 10 30 – – 10
– INAFOR*,a – 30 – 14 8
Source: Registration of denouncement ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
***p < .001.
a Pearson’s chi-square test.
b The participation of institutions include the following eight institutions: (i) the district environmental oﬃcer; (ii) the mayor or vice mayor; (iii) the police;
(iv) the military; (v) MARENA; (vi) MAGFOR; (vii) INAFOR; and (viii) the district environmental commission.
c The average number of institutions participating in the in-situ inspections is signiﬁcantly higher in Condega than in the remaining three districts, and
signiﬁcantly higher in the Estelı´ area than in the Santo Toma´s area (p < .05; one-way analysis of variance, Scheﬀe test).
d If only denouncements where in-situ inspections are included (n = 15), an average of 1.7 institutions participated in in-situ inspections in San Pedro de
Lo´vago, which statistically is comparable to that of Estelı´ district.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INEQUALITY FOR NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 79(19%), the being most common in San Pedro de Lo´vago. Only,
2% of the applications were rejected (all in Condega district)
and 9% of the applications were left undecided (all in San
Pedro de Lo´vago district) (Table 7).
With respect to the denouncements, 10% of the cases – all in
the Santo Toma´s area, namely 20% of the denouncements pre-
sented in San Pedro de Lo´vago and 72% of the denouncements
presented in Villa Sandino – were dropped because they were
found to lack suﬃcient evidence (Table 8). Unfortunately, we
do not have information to assess whether this reﬂects that the
denouncement was used as part of a conﬂict not directly
related to the issue of the denouncement itself or whetherother factors – or actors – resulted in the decision to drop
the case. In close to half of the denouncements, the denounced
person was notiﬁed (29%), warned not to repeat the infraction
(10%) or an agreement was reached between the parties (8%).
However, in slightly more than 40% of the denouncements a
sanction was applied directly (14%) or the case was passed
to the police (29%).
Turning to the second data set, which focuses on the eﬀorts
to regulate the use of ﬁre for land clearing in the Santo Toma´s
area during the period from 2003 to 2009, Table 9 shows that
between 190 and 490 farmers per year received district
authorization to use ﬁre for land clearing of an average of
Table 7. Decision made with respect to natural resource use application by district*** (N = 57). Percent applications per district by decision made
Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts (N = 134)
Estelı´
(n = 21)
Condega
(n = 58)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 42)
Villa Sandino
(n = 13)
Approval or conditional approval based on in-situ inspection 81 88 26 100 69
Rejection based on in-situ inspection – 3 – – 2
Approval or conditional approval based on community
endorsement only
– 3 – – 2
Approval or conditional approval by district environmental
oﬃcer without in-situ inspection or community endorsement
19 5 45 – 19
No decision made – – 29 – 9
All decisions 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Registration of applications ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
***p < 0.001; Pearson’s chi-square test.
Table 8. Decision made on denouncements by district (N = 57). Percent denouncements per district by decision made
Estelı´ area Santo Toma´s area All districts
(N = 57)Estelı´
(n = 20)
Condega
(n = 10)
San Pedro de
Lo´vago (n = 20)
Villa Sandino
(n = 7)
– Case was dropped due to lack of evidence – – 20 72 10
– Notiﬁcation of denounced person 30 80 5 14 29
– Agreement among the parties – 10 10 – 8
– Call of attention 5 – 20 – 10
– Sanction applied – – 35 – 14
– Case passed to the police 65 10 10 14 29
All decisions 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Registration of denouncement ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
Table 9. Authorizations issued for burning crop residues before planting in
the Santo Toma´s area, 2003–09. Number of farmers authorized, total and
average area per farmer (ha) allowed to be cleared through burning by year
Year Number of
farmersa
authorized
Total area authorized
to be cleared through
burning (ha)
Average area
per farmer
authorized to be
clearing through
burning (ha)
2003 190 200 1.0
2004 190 266 1.4
2005 250 350 1.4
2006 250 350 1.4
2007 490 686 1.4
2008 240 252 1.0
2009 229 160 0.7
All years 1,839 2,264 1.2
Source: Reconstruction of permissions issued by District Environmental
Units.
a Please note that these are not unique farmers as one farmer may have
received authorization during more than one year.
80 WORLD DEVELOPMENT1.2 hectare per farmer during this period. Many of the farmers
received their authorization on the basis of joint applications
submitted by a community leader on behalf of several, usually
small-scale farmers wanting to clear their ﬁelds before planting
maize and beans.
During the same period a total of 75 denouncements of
unauthorized or poorly controlled ﬁres were registered with
the district authorities in the Santo Toma´s area (Table 10).These denounced ﬁres on average aﬀected an average of
39 hectares, ranging from less than one to 500 hectares and
with a median of 11 hectares.
The majority of the denouncements of unauthorized or
poorly controlled ﬁres registered during 2003–09 in the Santo
Toma´s area (57%, data is not tabulated) involved owners of
farms larger than 140 hectares, while only 4% of the cases
implied owners of farms smaller than 70 hectares. In the
majority of the cases, the denounced ﬁres were related to clear-
ing of pastures.
As shown in Table 11, there is a tendency that the oﬀender
immediately accepted to pay the ﬁne in cases where the area
aﬀected by the ﬁre was very large (average area aﬀected by
the denounced ﬁres where denounced oﬀender immediately
accepted to pay the ﬁne was 134 hectares). In the cases where
the aﬀected area was not so large (on average 16 hectares), the
oﬀender tended to receive a notiﬁcation only, whereas in the
cases where the area aﬀected by the ﬁre was larger (on average
42 hectares), the oﬀender was ﬁned, but the ﬁne was not paid
and the case was passed on to MAGFOR or the prosecutor.
As the data presented above show, district authorities both
in the Santo Toma´s and the Estelı´ area have become spaces
that many citizens utilize to seek authorization for speciﬁc uses
of natural resources, or to denounce allegedly harmful or ille-
gal use of natural resources by others. However, the data also
show that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the institutional
practices that have developed among district authorities in
the two areas in order to respond to the concerns and requests
of citizens and to ensure sustainable natural resources use.
As a departmental capital, the city of Estelı´ enjoys the pres-
ence of most ministries and government agencies. Particularly
with respect to applications for permission to use natural
Table 11. Decision made on denouncements of unauthorized ﬁres and average area aﬀected in the Santo Toma´s area, 2003–09** (N = 75). Percent
denouncements by decision made
% Denouncements Average area aﬀected (ha)
Notiﬁed and warned by district authorities 41 15.7
Notiﬁed and ﬁned by district authorities; ﬁne paida 8 133.6
Notiﬁed and ﬁned by district authorities; ﬁne not paid; case passed on to
MAGFOR and/or prosecutor with no decision
51 42.4
All decisions 75 38.7
Source: Reconstruction of denouncements ﬁled with the District Environmental Units.
a The average area aﬀected per case denounced is signiﬁcantly for cases where the oﬀender was notiﬁed and paid the ﬁne than for the remaining categories
of cases (p < .05; one-way analysis of variance, Scheﬀe test).
** p < 0.01; One-way analysis of variance.
Table 10. Denouncements of unauthorized use of ﬁre for land clearing in the Santo Toma´s area, 2003–09. Number of denouncements and total and average
area aﬀected (ha)
Year Number of denouncements Area aﬀected (ha) Average area aﬀected per case denounced (ha)
2003 6 161 26.8
2004 5 393 78.5
2005 10 453 45.3
2006 10 406 40.6
2007 21 487 23.2
2008 17 912 53.7
2009 6 88 14.6
All years 75 2,899 38.7
Source: Reconstruction of denouncements ﬁled with District Environmental Units.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INEQUALITY FOR NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 81resources, this reduces the call upon the district environmental
unit. However, even in Estelı´ people prefer to ﬁle their
denouncements with district authorities rather than with other
authorities, 18 in part because ﬁling a denouncement with the
district authorities does not directly open a legal process –
something which many citizens hesitate to do.
None of the remaining districts count on permanent repre-
sentation from national authorities with natural resource-
related mandates. Despite this shared feature, signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent practices have developed in the districts for ensuring
coordination among institutions involved in the governance
of use of natural resources. Particularly Condega district has
had a well-functioning district environmental commission
which has met regularly every month over more than ﬁve
years, whereas neither San Pedro de Lo´vago or Villa Sandino
count on such regular fora for district-level coordination.
Moreover, in Condega MAGFOR, INAFOR and depending
on the agenda also MARENA participate in the district envi-
ronmental commission meetings whereas these institutions
rarely participate in the Santo Toma´s area. In addition to serv-
ing to facilitate inter-institutional coordination, the Condega
district environmental commission also serves as an opportu-
nity for the population, e.g., community representatives, to
present natural resource-related issues. Due to the fact that
Estelı´ district has four protected areas (partly) within its juris-
diction, the district counts on several protected area-related
platforms for inter-institutional interaction in addition to that
which is oﬀered by the district inter-institutional platform.
Although district environmental oﬃcers play an important
role to the functioning of such platforms, their establishment
and permanency in time require, and thus reﬂect political lead-
ership and support beyond what can be provided by district
environmental oﬃcers.
The existence of such platforms obviously facilitates both
horizontal interactions e.g., between natural resource profes-
sionals (agricultural, environmental, or forestry professionals)who work with the diﬀerent agencies and NGOs, and vertical
interactions e.g., between ministry representatives, district
staﬀ, and community representatives. This diﬀerence in the
institutional practices which have developed in the Estelı´ and
the Santo Toma´s area is further corroborated by the ﬁnding
that environmental oﬃcers in the Estelı´ area tend to be accom-
panied by representatives from other institutions when realiz-
ing in-situ inspections in relation to applications or
denouncements, while this is only rarely the case for their col-
leagues in the Santo Toma´s area. As expressed by the environ-
mental oﬃcer from Condega (personal communication, April
17, 2011), this practice of joint inspections helps to ensure ‘uni-
formity’ in the way decisions are made due to the fact that
more professionals participate in the assessment of a given sit-
uation and the interpretation of how the situation compares to
the legal and administrative framework. Thus, our results sug-
gest that this higher frequency of professional face-to-face
interactions contributes to limit the space for individual discre-
tion and interpretation in decision making (Mahoney &
Thelen, 2011). Although we do not have data to assess the
environmental impacts of natural resource governance as it
is performed in the two areas, our data suggest that a higher
proportion of the contacts from citizens (applications and
denouncements) are responded to in the Estelı´ area and that
the responses are more likely to be supported by empirical
technical evidence produced in interactions between actors
from diﬀerent institutions than is the case in the Santo Toma´s
area. In this way, these results echo the ﬁndings of Andersson
(2004) and Andersson and Ostrom (2008) from Bolivia of
positive correlation between the frequency of horizontal and
vertical interactions maintained by district forest authorities
and the quality of forest governance.
Despite these diﬀerences in the institutional practices that
have developed in the Santo Toma´s and Estelı´ areas, district
environmental oﬃcers both areas share the frustration of
having very limited possibilities for acting in cases of
82 WORLD DEVELOPMENTenvironmental oﬀenses beyond notifying and warning oﬀend-
ers of not repeating their oﬀense. Opportunities for issuing
sanctions such as ﬁnes are limited – both due to limited polit-
ical will to provide for environmental ﬁnes as part of the dis-
trict environmental by-laws and due to the limited legal as well
as human resource capacity to ensure compliance with the
sanction. In case of non-compliance, the district authorities
have to pass the case to competent authorities such as ministry
delegations or the prosecutor. As our data show, the cases very
often end there unresolved. This contributes to undermine the
authority of district environmental oﬃcers and limits the eﬀec-
tiveness of the district-level governance of natural resource
use. The eﬀorts to regulate the use of ﬁre for land clearing in
the Santo Toma´s area is a case in point. In fear of being issued
a ﬁne of NIO 5,000, which to a tenant farmer earning a con-
siderable part of his or her income through day-laboring cor-
responds to more than two months of salary, the majority of
small-scale farmers who wished to use ﬁre for clearing one
or two hectares before planting maize or beans made sure to
apply for permission (Table 9 above):
In general it is the small-scale farmers who are more careful, because to
them it is more diﬃcult to pay [the ﬁne]. They take more precaution
and are more careful to obtain a permit.
[Former District Environmental Oﬃcer, Santo Toma´s area, personal
communication, January 2010]
However, to a livestock farmer planning to clear his or her
15–20 hectare pasture before the onset of the rain, a NIO
5,000 ﬁne breaks even with the cost of hiring day-laborers to
cut back the vegetation. Knowing that most livestock farmers
have farms that are larger than 20 hectares and adding the fact
that many livestock farmers claim to have diﬃculties ﬁnding
‘trustworthy’ and ‘hard working’ day-laborers, make the risk
of having to pay a NIO 5,000 ﬁne seem even less threatening:
There is a man [un sen˜or] who sets ﬁre every year [. . .] He doesn’t invest
in clearing; his only expense is a match. He has around 10 farms. INA-
FOR issued a ﬁne but I don’t know how big it was. This year he also
set ﬁre, but not as strong. He likes to use ﬁre; it’s cheaper. He doesn’t
want to pay laborers and when you burn a pasture, it germinates faster
and grows faster with the onset of the rain.
[District Environmental Oﬃcer, Santo Toma´s area; personal commu-
nication, October, 2011]
Thus despite being illegal, the size of the ﬁne still makes the
use of ﬁre for the clearing of pastures, an economically attrac-
tive option particularly to the larger scale livestock keepers.
When adding that paying the ﬁne may be easily avoided, par-
ticularly by those who have contacts with district-level as well
as higher level institutions, the end result becomes ineﬀective
regulation of the use of ﬁre and loss of credibility of – and thus
frustration among – district environmental oﬃcers toward
those farmers who have made the eﬀort to apply for permis-
sion. As a consequence, eﬀorts to regulate the use of ﬁre for
land clearing are now suspended in the Santo Toma´s area.
Having discontinued the eﬀorts to regulate the use of ﬁre for
land preparation in the Santo Toma´s area, today it is mainly
large-scale, absentee land owners who solicit authorization
to use natural resources from district authorities, particularly
in San Pedro de Lo´vago (Table 3 above). With only limited
political support and aware that any in-situ inspections will
have to be performed unaccompanied, the district environ-
mental oﬃcers may perceive that they are left with little choice
but to approve the application without in situ inspection and
yield to the strong veto possibilities which these large-scale
farmers enjoy. Despite the attempts made, the institutional
practices for district-level governance of natural resource use
which had developed in the Santo Toma´s area did not succeedin gaining suﬃcient strength, e.g., through fostering inter-insti-
tutional interactions with professionals in other agencies, to
curb the veto power of the local political and economic elite.6. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical evidence provided by this paper from two
Nicaraguan territories corroborates the proposition that the
sub-national political and institutional context shapes the
institutional practices that develop within an otherwise com-
mon legal and administrative context. Since the establishment
of district environmental units, eﬀorts have been made both in
the Santo Toma´s area and in the Estelı´ area to develop insti-
tutional practices for the governance of natural resource use
in general and for dealing with what have been perceived as
important environmental problems, such as deforestation,
the use of ﬁre for the clearing of pastures, and the use of water
for irrigation in particular. Nonetheless, the institutional prac-
tices which have developed in the two territories examined dif-
fer markedly in at least two respects, namely in the extent to
which they facilitate, on the one hand, downward accountabil-
ity, and, on the other hand, vertical and horizontal interac-
tions between oﬃcers from diﬀerent levels of government.
As the paper demonstrates, the degree to which the prescribed
district environmental commissions have been established as
functioning and regular spaces for setting the agenda and
monitoring the progress with respect to district-level natural
resource governance, and institutional practices that have
developed for dealing with applications for natural resource
use permissions and denouncements of alleged natural
resource use infractions are cases in point.
The paper suggests that the pattern of inequality is an
important factor, shaping the political and institutional con-
text and thus the opportunities for institutional change. In
the Santo Toma´s area, considerable eﬀorts have been made
by the district environmental authorities to develop institu-
tional practices to regulate the use of ﬁre for the clearing of
pastures, including the formulation of by-laws, the develop-
ment of a permit system, attempts to coordinate eﬀorts with
important line ministries, etc. The ﬁrst to suﬀer the conse-
quences of ﬁres slipping out of control are the small- and med-
ium-scale farmers who live in the area and whose houses and
crops are put at risk. However, since the late 1990s small- and
medium-scale farmers have gradually been squeezed out of
production by large-scale livestock farmers and have thereby
gradually lost their strength as a social actor capable of hold-
ing district authorities to account. Thus, the political support
for the eﬀorts made by the district environmental units to
regulate the use of ﬁre for clearing pastures has gradually
weakened, and powerful livestock keepers have eﬀectively suc-
ceeded in undermining the institutional practices that had been
developed to the extent that they have now been suspended.
In the Estelı´ area, on the other hand, a considerable part of
the rural population still make their living as small- and med-
ium-scale farmers with a demonstrated ability to exert their
agency, at times as part of broader social coalitions counting
also parts of the urban population. Institutional practices have
developed and been sustained which facilitate vertical interac-
tions between district authorities and their rural constituents.
Examples include the establishment of protected areas and
the ensuing institutional practices, and the institutional
responses to the concerns with dry-season irrigation of
tobacco. In both cases, the ability to invoke central govern-
ment agencies through the regular vertical and horizontal
interactions maintained with and among between oﬃcers from
THE IMPORTANCE OF INEQUALITY FOR NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 83diﬀerent government agencies e.g., under the auspices of the
regular Condega district environmental commission and
through joint inspections, has been crucial to reduce the
degree to which decisions depend upon individual discretion
and interpretation and thus strengthen the legitimacy of deci-
sions made. Albeit not eliminating the veto possibilities of
powerful individuals, this combination of vertical and hori-
zontal interactions has also been instrumental in strengthening
the downward accountability of the district environmental
authorities and in curbing these veto possibilities and the space
for discretionary natural resource governance. Thereby, the
development of new institutional practices in response tonew policy domains such as natural resource governance,
may promote not only a process of gradual institutional
change but also of gradual political change. In this way, our
empirical results support the proposition made authors such
as Boyce (1994), Clement and Meunie (2010) and Li and
Reuveny (2006) and reiterated in the 2011 Human Develop-
ment Report (UNDP, 2011) that when those who perceive
environmental problems (e.g., lack of water, risk of having
fences and houses aﬀected by wild ﬁres, etc.) have more eﬀec-
tive representation – the likelihood of which increases with
decreasing levels of inequality – authorities are more likely
to address these environmental problems.NOTES1. The registration of applications and denouncements was supervised by
Rolando Buitrago, former research assistant with Nitlapan, Universidad
Centroamericana (UCA), Managua. In Condega district, the registration
covers the period from January to August 2011. However, only applica-
tions submitted between April and August 2011 are included in the tables
presented in this paper.
2. Permission for undertaking the registration of applications and
denouncements was not granted by the mayor of Santo Toma´s district.
3. Luis Enrique Sevilla Fajardo, who served as the district environmental
oﬃcer in Condega district during 2006–10, i.e., prior to the onset of ﬁeld
work reported in this paper.
4. 1 manzana = 0.7 hectare.
5. On the basis of INEC (1963, 2001).
6. Owners of properties smaller than 14 hectares.
7. Overall, the population of the Santo Toma´s area declined from 37,263
inhabitants in 1995 to 37,206 inhabitants in 2005. During the same period,
the rural population declined from 18,042 inhabitants to 15,166 inhab-
itants, corresponding to a decline of 16%.
8. The population of the Estelı´ area grew from 118,143 inhabitants in
1995 to 140,565 inhabitants in 2005. During the same period, the rural
population grew from 38,737 to 40,377 inhabitants.
9. Ley de Municipios (leyes 40 and 261).
10. Ley de Municipios, Ley No. 40, Article 6.11. Ley de Municipios, Ley No. 40, Article 7.
12. Ley 217.
13. Leyes 462 and 585.
14. Ley 620.
15. In an eﬀort to assess and compare the performance of Nicaraguan
district authorities, the national institute for district development (INI-
FOM) has developed a set of district performance indicators. In the 2007
assessment Condega and Santo Toma´s were ranked ﬁfth and sixth within
their category, whereas San Pedro de Lo´vago and Villa Sandino were
ranked 12th and 31st, respectively within the same category. About Villa
Sandino, observers of E´tica y Transperencia stated that the district does
not count on e.g., written procedures for contracting staﬀ at the district
administration and that there is widespread distrust and civic apathy
among the population toward the district authorities (E´tica y Transpar-
encia, 2010; here quoted from Go´mez & Buitrago, 2012).16. In Condega district, the district environmental commission meets
regularly the last Wednesday every month. In Estelı´ district which is the
departmental capital, the inter-institutional environmental platform has
during the past two years undertaken the functions of the district
environmental commission and convenes the ﬁrst Thursday every month.17. Ley 559.18. In addition to being reﬂected in our registration of applications and
denouncements, this was also explained by one of the Estelı´ district
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